“An obligation entered into by two or more persons, so that each is liable severally, and all liable jointly, and a creditor or obligee may sue one or more severally, or all jointly, at his option.” Who can demand performance of joint promises? The answer to this question is found in Section 45 which provides that when a promise is made to several persons jointly, then, unless a contrary intention appears from the contract, the right to claim performance rests with all the promisees jointly and a single promisee cannot demand performance. When any one of the promisees dies, the right to claim performance rests with the legal representatives of such deceased person jointly with the surviving promisees. When all the promisees are dead, the right to claim performance rests with all of them jointly and on the death of any promisee his legal representatives step into his shoes.
It is not at first sight obvious that whereas a promise by two persons and each of them is a joint and several promises on which either or both may be sued, a promise by two persons and each of them is a joint promise only on which both must sue. Nor is it obvious that on a promise by two a cause of action lies against one, while on a promise to two no cause of action lies by one. Again, the questions What is, and What is the reason of, the difference in effect between a judgment (i.) against one of two joint contractors; (ii.) against one of two joint and several contractors; (iii.) against one of two joint tortfeasors, are questions which it is not easy to answer at all, and perhaps impossible to answer satisfactorily. The most important thing is that a promise by two or more persons to perform an act is a promise that they or some or one of them will perform it; but a promise to two or more persons to perform an act is not a promise to them or some or one of them, but a promise to them all, to perform it. In the former case the promise may be performed by one, in the latter, the promise cannot be enforced by one. In the former case, the parties to the agreement contemplated that the obligation may be discharged by one, for a man who agrees in conjunction with others to pay.
JOINT LIABILITY AND ITS ENFORCEABILITY
Joint liability, several liabilities and joint and several liabilities are concepts that are all used by courts in cases where there are more than two parties to a contract. These concepts essentially establish who is responsible for what act or omission, or as in case of joint liability all promisors, will be held liable together.
If parties have joint liability, then they are each liable up to the full amount of the relevant obligation. If one party dies, disappears or is declared bankrupt, the other remains fully liable The converse is several liabilities, and it arises when two or more persons make separate promises to another, under a single or different instrument.
Joint and several liability is “liability that may be apportioned either among two or more parties or to only a few select members of the group at the adversaries discretion. Thus each liable party is individually responsible for the entire obligation, but a paying party may have a right of contribution and indemnity from non-paying parties.”In this two or more persons in the same instrument, promise jointly to do the same thing, and also make separate promises to do the same thing. It gives rise to one joint obligation and as many several obligations, as there are joint and several promisors. As in joint liability, the performance by one discharges all. Section 42 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, states that: ‘When two or more persons have made a joint promise, then unless a contrary intention appears by the contract , all such persons during their joint lives, and , after the death of any of them, his representative jointly with the survivor or survivors, and after death of the last survivor, the representatives of all jointly must fulfill the promise.’
Section 42 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, makes the liability of joint promisors, joint and several. All promisors, in this case, are bound to perform the promise and in case of death of any promisor, the promise must be performed by the surviving promisors along with the legal representatives of the deceased promisor.
Section 43 of the Indian Contract act, 1872, states that: “Anyone of joint promisors may be compelled to perform – when two or more persons make a joint promise, the promise may, in the absence of express agreement to the contrary, compel any such of such joint promisors to perform the whole promise. Each promise may compel contribution – Each of two or more joint promisors may compel every other joint promisor to contribute equally with himself to the performance of the promise unless a contrary intention appears from the contract. Sharing of loss by default in contribution – If any one of the two or more joint promisors makes default in such contribution, the remaining joint promisors must bear the loss arising from such default in equal shares.” Section 43 entitles the promisee to claim performance from anyone, or, more of the promisors. It also provides for a right of one or more promisors to compel contribution from the others, and the sharing of loss in the event of default in contribution. These provisions though can be altered by providing the contrary in the contract. The above section makes all joint contracts joint and several. Where Debts are jointly incurred, each promisor is liable for the whole amount. A joint contract unenforceable against one of the joint promisors on the ground of lack of signature or his not having agreed at all can be enforced only against the one who signed it. It has also been held that neither the minority nor insolvency of one of the joint promisor affects the liability of the others. If one of the joint promisors dies pending suit, the suit can be instituted against the other defendant promisors without bringing his legal representatives on record.
A slightly different view was taken in Kedar Nath v. L Manak Chand, The principle applied in this case was that when a suit against a number of joint promisors has been dismissed, the plaintiff cannot prosecute an appeal against only some of them, renouncing his claim against the rest.
The Code of Civil Procedure 1908 provides: „The plaintiff may, at his option, join as parties to the same suit all or any of the persons severally, or jointly and severally, liable on any one contract, including parties to bills of exchange, hundis, and promissory notes.‟
This when read along with section 43 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, makes the effect of joint liability arising out of a contract, the same as where the liability is joint and several. Under this section, the lender may sue all or any of the joint promisors as he may choose.
This section allows the promisee to sue such one or several joint promisors as he chooses, and excludes the right of a joint promisor to be sued only along with his co-promisors.If a party is being sued severally, separate from his co-contractors, he may apply to the court, for his co-contractor to be joined in the suit, not because such co-contractor ought to be party to the suit, but if the court considers it necessary to do so.
Cases on Promissory Notes
In the case of Joint Family of Mukundas Raja Bhagwandas & Sons v. State Bank Of Hyderabad: A bank filed a suit on a promissory note against the defendants where the liability was joint and several. The High Court on equitable grounds directed that the decree must first be realized from one defendant and for the balance if any the execution was to be taken against the other defendant. The Supreme Court held that such a decree requiring one of the joint promisee’s to pay in the first instance in the first instance and then to proceed against the others, was bad in law, there being no such equitable principle or statutory provision and it converted the decree to a joint and several one against all the defendants.
There is considerable difference of opinion among about the effect of a decree against only some of the joint promisors, where a judgment has been obtained against one or only some of the joint 6
promisors. The Calcutta High Court Held that a decree obtained against one of the several joint makers of a promissory note is a bar to subsequent action against the others.
In the case of T Radhakrishna Chettiar v. K.V. Muthukrishnam Chettiar:
A case based on equitable mortgage, the appellant filed a suit as the respondent did not pay his share of the mortgage on land that they had taken for their company for which they were running jointly. The name of the company was „Central Brokers‟. Appellant had taken a promissory note from the bank for the company. The defendant knew that the appellant had taken such a promissory note on behalf of the company, but claimed that as the appellant had taken the note, he had no personal liability towards the promissory note. Due to this, the appellant was sued for the promissory note. The Allahabad high court viewed the appellant and respondent had joint and several liability as per section 43 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Thus the respondent and the appellant were both required to pay and discharge their respective obligations. The principle used in this was opposite to the Calcutta High Court Judgement. The principle applied was that if the decree against some only of the joint promisors remained unsatisfied, the second suit against other joint contractors was not barred. When a contract is concluded with a joint venture group, all members are made jointly and severally liable, even if only one is capable of rendering the service in question. Each of a number of co-tenants under section 43 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, separately liable to the landlord for the whole rent, and a suit is maintainable also against all the heirs of one deceased co-tenant without making the other co-tenants a party.
Death of one of Joint Promisors
If one of the joint promisors dies pending suit, the suit can be proceeded against the other defendant promisors without bringing his legal representatives on record. But when a suit against a number of joint promisors has been dismissed the plaintiff cannot prosecute an appeal against only some of them, renouncing his claim against the rest. In the case of pending an appeal against a decree obtained against promisors, one of the promisors dies and the appeal will come into an end as far as the deceased person is concerned because the appeal can proceed against the other joint promisors. The abatement does’t affect the right of the surviving promisors for contribution against deceased joint promisor‟s estate. Partnership Section 43 speaks about parties making a joint promise and it has no application where parties are jointly interested by operation of law in a contract made by a single person. Hence the section does not apply to the case of several heirs of the original debtor, and they all must be joined as parties to the suit.
Whether a sale deed by a number of vendees makes all vendees jointly liable or makes each vendee responsible for his own share only, would be a question of fact depending on the intention of the parties. The burden of showing that under the contract, each promisor is not separately liable lies on that joint promisor who wished to resist such a suit on this ground.
Section 43 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, includes the word “contribution”. This basically implies under section 43 that if the claimant pursues one defendant and receives payment, that defendant must then pursue the other obligors for a contribution to their share of the liability. Contribution in joint and several liability can be defined as, the right that gives one of the several persons who are liable for a common debt the ability to recover ratably from each of the others when that one person discharges the debt for the benefit of all.‟ Contribution is between persons equally bound and signifies payment by each of the parties interested of his share in any common liability. Section 43 gives a promisor compelled to perform a promise a right to compel his co-promisors to make a contribution. This contract of contribution is independent of any contract as between the joint promisors and the promisee‟s and the latter can not absolve in any way the joint promisor from his liability of contribution towards other joint promisors, who may have performed the promise. In order to claim contribution, one joint promisor must have made payment or, performed or omitted to perform an act as given in the contract, to the promise either under compulsion or voluntarily. The fact that the promisor claiming contribution, made the contribution without consulting his co–promisor, does not affect his right to contribution. This liability of joint contributors is primarily to contribute to the performance of the promise.
In a landmark case decided before the enactment of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, it was held that the mere existence of a decree against one of several joint debtors did not afford ground for a suit for contribution against other debtors, until he has discharged that which he says ought to be treated as a common burden, or at any rate done something towards the discharge of it, he cannot say that there is anything of which he has relieved his co-debtors, and which he can call upon to share with him.
Section 43 speaks of two or more persons making a joint promise, and it has no application where parties become jointly interested by operation of law in a contract made by a single person. Hence, the section does not apply to the case of several heirs of the original debtor, and they all must be joined as parties to the suit. A Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court held that a case of a rent suit against some only of the heirs was maintainable, as the court had the power to add parties under CPC. The Orissa and Rajasthan High Courts in MawajiRamji v. Premjit Kumbhabhai Chanda and Chandrabhan v Misrimal respectively have followed the Full Bench judgment of the Calcutta High Court and applied co-heirs of a single promisor. As a matter of fact, in the Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court, Mukherji J had expressly referred to section 43 and confined his opinion to cases not falling under contract, but where there is privity of estate. It is submitted that the former view is correct on the wording of the section and the Calcutta Full Bench judgment cannot be said to be an authority to the contract under section 43 of the Contract Act Section 44 of The Indian Contract Act, 1872, that states, ‘Where two or more persons have made a joint promise, a release of one such joint promisors by the promisee does not discharge the other joint promisor or joint promisors; neither does it free the joint promisors so released from the responsibility to the other joint promisor or joint promisors.’
In the case of Devilal v. Himatram & Ors.:
All defendant parties had taken had jointly taken a contract for construction of a Town Hall of Udaipur as partners even though the contract was sanctioned by the City Corporation of Udaipur in the names of defendants Himmatram and Narottam Swaroop only. Further allegations were that while entering into a subcontract with the plaintiff-appellant Devilal, the defendant Kanaiyalal acted as an agent for the rest of the partners. In the relief clause, the plaintiff claimed relief that a decree be passed. The trial court passed the decree but for a less amount than asked and the amount was reduced further by the district judge. The plaintiff Devilal, therefore, filed this second appeal. Himmat Ram died during the pendency of the suit, but the surviving defendants were his partners. The plaintiff has claimed a money decree against all the defendants jointly and severally for the amount which may be found due to the plaintiff from the partnership. In view of section 44 of the contract act, the discharge of one of the promisors from, in this case, Himmat Ram due to his death does not imply that the rest of the defendants are also discharged from performing their promise. The appeal was allowed and the suit did not abate.
The principal, in this case, was that abatement of an appeal against one joint debtor or death of one joint promisor does not release the other joint promisors.
In comparison to English, the law the principles applied in these sections are different. In English law, joint promisors are all jointly liable to pay the whole debt. If the promisee sues one of the joint promisors, it is at the option of this promisor whether to bring his other co-promisors to the suit or not. In Indian law, the promisee may sue joint promisors, at his option, jointly or individually. Also, the promisor being sued does not have the option of involving his co-promisors in the suit instituted against him. The court may call upon, the other co-promisors if it feels it is required.
JOINT RIGHTS AND ITS ENFORCEABILITY
Devolution of joint rights is governed by almost the same kind of principles as the devolution of joint liabilities. When a promise is made to more than one person jointly, the right to claim performances rests with all of them jointly. If anyone of them dies, it rests with his legal representatives jointly, Section 45 is as follows: Devolution of joint rights – When a person has made a promise to two or more persons jointly, then, unless a contrary intention appears from the contract, the right to claim performance rests, as between him and them, with them during their joint lives, and, after the death of one of them, with the representative of such deceased person jointly with the survivor or survivors, and, after the death of the last survivor, with the representatives of all jointly. Illustrations
A, in consideration of 5,000 rupees lent to him by B and C, promises B and C jointly to repay them that sum with interest on the day specified. B dies. The right to claim performance rests with B’s representatives jointly with C during C‟s life and after the death of C, with the representatives of B and C jointly.
In the absence of any contrary intention appearing from the contract the right to claim performance, that is, the right of joint promisees to claim performance is a joint right, and in case of death of any one of them the representatives of the deceased is entitled to the benefit with all survivors. In all cases of joined promises, there is always one promise in favor of all the joined promises. Therefore it is not open to one of the joint promisees to sue either the performance of the promise in its entirety or to the extent of his share.
The Supreme Court in Anokhe lal v. Radhamohan bansal has held that the principle made out in section 45 applies to a situation where one person has made a promise to two or more people jointly. The right to claim the performance of the contract arising out of such a promise would then rest with those promisees together with their joined lives and after the death of any one of them, such a right would be passed on the legal regal representatives of the deceased jointly with the surviving promisees. If the joint promisees were partners in a firm, this provision obliges the legal representatives of a deceased partner to join the rest in the enforcement of the right to have performance of the contract. This is the gist of Section 45 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Right of Joint Promisees Under the English law, the right of a joint promisee devolves, after his death; on the survivors. The section departs from the English law in that the right devolves not on the survivors alone, but on them along with the legal representatives of the deceased promisee. This section applies to all joint promisees whether they are partners, co-shares, mortgages, joint lessors or members of a joint Hindu family carrying on business in partnership. In case where the owner of a single right dies, and several persons become entitled to it, it has been held that all of them must join in a suit to enforce the right and if any of them refuses to join the plaintiff, he must be added as a defendant, obviously, joint promises cannot divide the debt among themselves and sue severally for the portions. Co-heirs of Single Promisee
Section 45 does not indicate what happens to a single right when the owner of it dies, and several persons become entitled to it. On the death of the original promisee, his heirs do not become themselves several joint promisees. In such a case, it has been held that all of them must join in a suit to enforce the right, and if any of them refuses to join as the plaintiff, he must be added as a defendant.
Right to performance of promises during joint lives
As the right to claim the performance of a promise in the case of joint promisees rests with them all during their joint lives, all the joint promisees should sue upon the promise. Obviously, joint promisees cannot divide the debt among them and sue severally for the portions. If a suit is instituted against a debtor in his individual capacity, he cannot set off a debt owed jointly to him by the creditor. It is not open to one of two or more joint promisees to sue alone either for performance of the whole promise or to the extent of his share, all of them being necessary parties, the suit is liable to be dismissed on omission to implead any of them. Those joint promisees, who cannot be joined as plaintiffs, may be joined as defendants. This applies equally to a suit by an assignee of part of a debt, who must join the transferee and the other promisees as parties to the suit. Therefore, where two person contract with a third person, a suit by one of the joint promisees making the other a co-defendant is maintainable, even if the plaintiff does not prove that the other co-promisee has refused to join as a co-plaintiff. If a suit is brought by some of the joint promisees only, and the other promisees are subsequently added as plaintiffs, whether on objection taken by the defendant, or by the court of its own motion, the whole suit will be dismissed, if it is at that time barred by limitation as regards the other promisees. Notwithstanding s 45 of this Act, a partner in a registered firm can sue in the firm’s name under O XXX, r 4 of the CPC, and need not join the legal representatives of a deceased partner as parties to the suit.
Where any one of the joint promisee dies, the right to enforce the promise vests in the surviving promisees jointly with the legal representatives of the deceased. Hence, an appeal would abate on the death of one of the joint promisees, if his legal representatives were not brought on record.
Discharge by One of Several Joint Promisees
In English law, the rule laid down in Wallace v Kelsal, seems to have been accepted in England, and the rule that payment to one of the joint creditors is a good discharge is still the general rule. In English law, release by one of the creditors, releases the debtor qua all the creditors, but in Indian law, the position is that the joint creditors are presumed to be tenants-in-common, and therefore, release by one of such creditors does not give a release on behalf of all the creditors, unless a contrary intention appears from the contract. In any case, discharge by one of the co-promisees or payment to him is valid only to the extent of his own share in the debt. ‘Unless a Contrary Intention Appears’
Payment to one joint mortgagee, who was the manager and agent of others, discharged the liability. Where the agreement contained a term that half of the rent will be paid to each share, and the tenant actually paid rent accordingly, each sharer had the right to maintain suit for recovery of rent separately, without joining the other as a party. Only some of the joint promisees have been held to file a suit, where a hatchita was executed by a person in favor of himself and three others, each having a definite share.
A suit can be filed by all the partners of a firm, or under O XXX, r 1 of the CPC, by any or all of them in the name of the firm. These provisions constitute an exception to Section 45 of this Act, provided the plaint discloses that the suit has been brought by the firm and the partners signing have done so only as partners. A suit under O XXX, r 1 of the CPC 1908 can be instituted even by one of the partners, even ‘though the other partners are not joined as necessary parties. But a single partner cannot sue in his own name, especially when the firm is found not to exist. A suit to enforce a mortgage in favour of a firm can be brought, under O XXXr 4 of the CPC, and the persons suing will be all the partners constituting the firm, whose name is registered in the Register of Firms, when the cause of action arose. The provisions of O XXX of 14 the CPC, are enabling provisions, and do not prevent the partners of a firm from suing or being sued in their individual names. If partners sue in their individual names, all must join as co-plaintiffs, or in any case, be joined as defendants.
Order XXX, r 4 of the CPC 1908 is an exception to the provisions of this section and provides that where a suit is brought in the name of the firm, it is not -necessary to join the legal representatives of a partner; thereby setting at rest the divergent views of various high courts. But if a partner has died before the commencement of a suit against the firm, the plaintiff cannot make the deceased partner’s separate estate liable without adding his legal representatives as parties to the suit. The representative of the estate of a deceased partner may maintain a suit for the recovery of a partnership debt, and may join the surviving partners as defendants in the suit where they refuse to join as plaintiff. On the death of the last surviving partner in a partnership, the representatives of all the partners are entitled to be impeded and the suit will be proceeded with and not abate.
Mortgagees taking a joint security for the money advanced must, in the absence of anything shown to the contrary, be regarded as tenants-in-common, having separate interest in the money advanced and not as joint tenants. But a payment to one co-mortgagee, without consent of others, does not give a valid discharge of debt due to others. A suit for ejectment and rent by a co-mortgagee lessor without impleading the legal representatives of a deceased co-mortgagee lessor was not maintainable. Where a mortgagee dies leaving male and female heirs in accordance with The Hindu Succession Act 1956, no one heir, not even the karta of the coparcenary, can bring a suit on the mortgage without joining all the heirs as parties to the suit; the reason is that mortgage being one and indivisible and the mortgage having devolved on all the heirs jointly, no suit can be brought except on the principle of individuality. Where, by the terms of a mortgage, interest was payable by the mortgagor to two mortgagees jointly, it was held that upon the death of one of the mortgagees, his legal representative was entitled to moiety of the interest due under the mortgage.
Suit by a surviving partner
The general rule of English law is that joint contracts are enforceable by the survivors or survivor alone. There is an equitable exception, founded on mercantile custom, as to debts due to partners: but even in this case „although the right of the deceased partner devolves on his executor their remedy services to his co-partner, who alone must enforce the right by action and will be liable on recovery to account to the executor of administrator for the share of the deceased‟. The present section extends the mercantile rule of substantive right to all cases of joint contracts. It seems to be the better option that the representatives of a deceased partner are not necessarily parties to the suit for recovery of debt which accrues due to the partnership in the lifetime of the deceased. The dissolved partnership firm may sue for debt.
Deceased partner’s estate
The high court of Bombay has decided, after full examination of the rule and the present section of the act in the light of both Indian and English authorities, that where a partner has died before the commencement of a suit against the firm, the rule doesn’t enable the act to make the deceased partner‟s separate estate liable without adding his legal representatives as parties.
Suit by representatives of deceased partner
The representative of the estate of deceased partner may maintain a suit for the recovery of a partnership debt, d may join the surviving partners as defendants in the suit where they refuse to join as plaintiffs.
The application of the principle in this section may be excluded by statutes, especially those relating to securities, which provide that:
1) Securities payable to one r more persons jointly shall, on death of any of them, be payable to the survivor or survivors.
2) Securities payable to one or more persons severally, shall be payable on death of any of them to any of the survivors or the legal representative(s) of the deceased holder;
3) Any one or more joint holder can give effectual receipt for interest, unless notice is given by the other holders to the promisor.
Exceptions to section 45:
Order 30, Rule 4(1) Of Code Of Civil Procedure. The supreme court in Anokhe Lal v. Radhamohan bansal had held that Order 30, Rule 4(1) Of Code of Civil Procedure Is an exception to the S.45 of the act. The said rule reads as under: 1. Not withstanding anything contained in section 45 of the Indian contracts act, 1872, where two or more person may use or be used in the name of the firm under the foregoing provisions and any of such person dies, whether before the institution or during the pendency of any suit, it shall not be necessary to join the legal representative of the deceased as a party to the suit. 2. Nothing in sub-rule(1) shall limit or otherwise affect any right which the legal representative of the deceased may have to apply to be made a part of the suit, or to enforce any claim against the survivor or survivors.‟ The Supreme Court has held that what sub-rule (1) of rule 4 in Order 30 of the code provides is that there it is not mandatory to join the legal representatives of a deceased partner as a party in the said suit. What sub-rule (2) says is that sub-rule (1) is not a hindrance to any legal representative of a deceased partner to get himself impeded if he has otherwise any right to do so.
Thus section 42 & 43 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, deal with contracts when two or more parties are on one side in a contract. It bifurcates all joint promisors liability, and makes joint 17
liability joint and several. It provides relief to one of the joint promisors, in case the others are not party to the suit and sets out a scope for all joint promisors to demand contribution from their co-promisors. This section also sets out a procedure for contribution in case of death or insolvency of any of the co-promisors. Section 44 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, we can see that the promisee can release any one of the joint promisors from their obligation. This will not affect the liability of the co-promisors as they may continue to be fully liable to the promisee. The promisee may take action against any of the co-promisors who have not been released by him/her. While taking up Section 45 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, When a promise is made to more than one person jointly, the right to claim performances rests with all of them jointly. If anyone of them dies, it rests with his legal representatives jointly Hence section 42, 43, 44 & 45 are an integral part of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 in case of contracts where there are joint promisors on either side.
 Osborne’s Concise Law Dictionary
 Addison v. Gibson, 10 Q.B. 106
 Rolls v. Yate, Yelv.177
 Joint and several liability page 933 Black‟s Law dictionary(8th Edition)
 AIR 1961 Punj 55
 Shankerlal v. Motilal AIR 1957 Raj 267
 Jainarain Ram Lundia v. Surajmull Sagarmull AIR 1949 FC 211
 AIR 1971 SC 449
 Hemendro Coomar Mullick Vs. Rajendrolall Monshee (1878) ILR 3 Cal 353
 AIR 1970 Mad 337
 Ibid 11
 Jai Kishen Das v. AryaPritiNidhiSabha AIR 19921 Lah 357
 Raghunath Das v. Baleshwar Prasad Chaudhari AIR 1927 Pat 426
 Contribution pg 352 Black‟s Law Dictionary (8th Edition)
 Nagendra Chandra v. Pushupatty AIR 1949 Cal 12
 Ram Pershad Singh v. Neerbhoy Singh (1872) 11 BLR 76
 AIR 1967 Ori 158
 AIR 1955 Raj 11
 AIR 1973 Raj 39
 AIR 1997 SC 257
 Ahinsa Bibi v. Abdul Kader Saheb (1902) ILR 25 Mad 26
 Panbai v. Sajjanraj AIR 1969 Raj 278
 Jahar Roy v. Premji Bhimji Mansata AIR 1977 SC 2439
 Tarachand v Hulkar Mal AIR 1979 Del 160
 (1840) 7 M & W 264
 Nabendra Nath Basak v Shasabindoo Nath Basak AIR 1941 Cal 595
 Indian Contract Act 1872
 Bharat Sarvodaya Mills Co Ltd v Mohatta Bros AIR 1969 Guj 178
 Mathuradas Kanji Matani v Ebrahim Fazalbhoy AIR 1927 Bom 581
 Kanthu Punja v Vittamma (1901-02) ILR 25 Mad (VI) 754
 See The Indian Securities Act 1920, s 21; The Major Port Trusts Act 1963, ss 68-69; The Public Debt Act 1944, s 8. 1
 32 AIR 1997 SC 257